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Abstract— This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic sig-
naling game motivated by the well-known strategic information
transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model
involves information transmission between two agents, a sender
who observes two Gaussian processes, state and bias, and a
receiver who takes an action based on the received message from
the sender. The players incur quadratic instantaneous costs as
functions of the state, bias and action variables. Our particular
focus is on the Stackelberg equilibrium, which corresponds
to information disclosure and Bayesian persuasion problems
in economics. Prior work solved the static game, and showed
that the Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved by pure strategies
that are linear functions of the state and the bias variables.
The main focus of this work is on the dynamic (multi-stage)
setting, where we show that the existence of a pure strategy
Stackelberg equilibrium, within the set of linear strategies,
depends on the problem parameters. Surprisingly, for most
problem parameters, a pure linear strategy does not achieve
the Stackelberg equilibrium which implies the existence of a
trade-off between exploiting and revealing information, which
was also encountered in several other asymmetric information
games.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on signaling games where information
transmission occurs between a sender who observes the state
perfectly, and a receiver who takes actions based on the
received signals from the sender. The agents have misaligned
objectives that are functions of the state and the actions. The
literature on such games typically focuses on the settings
where the sender transmits exogenous information to the
receiver [1], [2]. Recent pioneering works on Bayesian
persuasion [3] and optimal information disclosure [4] depart
from this tradition by instead asking what information the
sender would generate if he initially is as uninformed as
the receiver and commits to fully revealing the output of a
transmission strategy that is determined based on the statis-
tics, ex-ante. More formally, while the classical prior work
has focused on the Nash equilibrium, recent works analyze
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the same problem setting.
Applications range from prosecutors gathering evidence for
presentation at court (a prosecutor-sender trying the persuade
a judge-receiver for a guilty verdict, by carefully selecting
which tests-transmission strategies to apply) to specifying
the terms of free trials of recently developed products. Due
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to wide applicability of such mathematical models, there has
been a growing interest in such problems in the economics
literature, see e.g., [3]–[12], and very recently in control [13],
[14]. Reference [13] has studied networked estimation with
biased sensors in the context of Stackelberg equilibrium, and
in [14], the authors have extended the approach of [1] to
noisy and multidimensional settings.
The commitment of the agents yields radically different
conclusions in terms of optimal strategies. For example,
while it is well understood that optimal strategies achieving
Nash equilibria are non-injective, the Stackelberg equilibrium
admits linear optimal strategies for settings involving Gaus-
sian variables and quadratic cost functions [15]. Sender’s
commitment is also essential for the derivation of the funda-
mental bounds in communication using information theory,
which models the problem in terms of ex-ante mappings that
are designed based on statistics, see [16] for more details.
Computation of optimal strategies for general dynamic
Gaussian-quadratic games with asymmetric information has
been an active research area, see e.g., [17] and the references
therein. In this paper, we focus on a particular finite horizon
dynamic signaling game with two players: a sender and a re-
ceiver. The sender observes two primitive random processes
(the state and the bias) and sends a signal to the receiver who
takes actions based on the received signal. The state and the
bias processes evolve as independent (uncontrolled) Gaussian
processes, and players incur quadratic instantaneous costs.
The static version of this problem was solved in [15], [16]
(see also [18]). The main conclusion of the static game is
that the Stackelberg equilibrium admits essentially unique
pure strategies that are linear functions of the state and
the bias variables. It is intuitively expected that a similar
conclusion would hold in the dynamic version of the same
game. Here, we show that this intuition is correct for only
very specific problem parameters (when the strategies are
restricted to be linear), while, in general, the equilibrium is
achieved by mixed strategies which imply that the sender
adds noise to its signal at the equilibrium. This result can
be interpreted as follows: In the first stage of the game, the
optimal sender strategy is to transmit a linear function of the
state and the bias variable. But for most problem parameters
(which we characterize precisely in Section IV), this pure
strategy reveals too much to the receiver about the sender
variables available at the second stage, and is suboptimal
for the second stage performance of the sender. Hence, the
sender faces a trade-off between the first and second stages
of this game in terms of his strategies. This trade-off results
in mixed strategies that are equivalent, when constrained to
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linear strategies, to adding independent noise to the sender’s
signal to hide information about the second stage. In passing,
we note that similar trade-offs were also observed in more
general asymmetric information games where exploiting the
available information comes with the cost of revealing it, see
e.g., [19].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
provide preliminaries. In Section III, we investigate the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. In Section IV, we present
our main result on the Stackelberg equilibrium. In Section
V, we discuss contributions and future research directions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider the two discrete-time, stationary, exogenous
processes {xk}, the state, and {θk}, the bias, that evolve
according to the following first-order autoregressive models
xk+1 = Axxk+wk,
θk+1 = Aθθk+ vk, k = 1,2, · · · , (1)
where Ax,Aθ ∈Rp×p, x1∼N(0,Σx), θ1∼N(0,Σθ ), and x1⊥
θ1.1 The additive noise processes {wk} and {vk} are white
Gaussian random processes, i.e., wk ∼ N(0,Σw) and vk ∼
N(0,Σv), which are independent of each other, and of the
current state xk and bias θk.
Let there be two decision makers: a sender and a receiver,
which take actions according to different objectives. Here,
only the sender has access to the state and the bias variables.
In particular, at time instant k, the sender has access to xk1
and θ k1 , where, by a possible abuse of notation, we define
the augmented vectors xkj := [x
′
j · · ·x′k]′ and θ kj := [θ ′j · · ·θ ′k]′.
Sender’s actions yk, for k = 1,2, · · · , are given by
yk = ηk(xk1,θ
k
1 ,z
k
1)
=
k
∑
j=1
Bk, jx j+Ck, jθ j+Dk, jz j, (2)
where Bk, j,Ck, j,Dk, j ∈ Rr×p are design parameters, zk ∼
N(0, I) for k = 1,2, · · · , are multivariate Gaussian random
variables that are independent of each other and of the
other parameters, and zk1 = [z
′
1 · · ·z′k]′. Particularly, the sender
chooses the policy2 ηk(·, ·, ·) from the policy space Ωk, which
is the set of linear functions that map from Rkp×Rkp×Rkp
to Rr, i.e., ηk(·, ·, ·) ∈Ωk.
Even though the receiver does not have access to the state
and bias parameters, he/she has access to the actions of
sender, and takes actions uk, are given by
uk = γk(y1, · · · ,yk), (3)
for k = 1,2, · · · , and the policy γk(·) is chosen from the
policy space Γk which is the set of all Lebesgue measurable
functions from Rkr to Rp, i.e., γk(·) ∈ Γk.
1Here, Rp×p denotes the space of p× p matrices with real-valued entries,
N(0, .) denotes the multivariate Gaussian distribution with zero mean and
designated covariance, and X ⊥ Y means that the random variables X and
Y are independent.
2In this paper, we use the terms “policy" and “strategy" interchangeably.
The sender wants to minimize the following finite horizon
objective3
JT (η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1, · · · ,γn) =
n
∑
k=1
E
{‖xk+θk−uk‖2} (4)
over ηk(·, ·, ·) ∈ Ωk, for k = 1, · · · ,n. The objective of the
receiver is to minimize a different function,
JR(η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1, · · · ,γn) =
n
∑
j=1
E
{‖xk−uk‖2} (5)
over γk(·) ∈ Γk, for k = 1, · · · ,n.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
We first consider the case in which the agents announce
their policies simultaneously. This corresponds to a Nash
equilibrium problem [20] such that in the equilibrium, no
agent has any incentive to change his/her policy unilaterally.
In particular, equilibrium achieving policy pairs (η∗,γ∗),
where η∗ := (η∗1 , · · · ,η∗n ) and γ∗ := (γ∗1 , · · · ,γ∗n ), minimize
JT (η1, · · · ,ηn;γ∗1 , · · · ,γ∗n ) and JR(η∗1 . · · · ,η∗n ;γ1, · · · ,γn), re-
spectively.
For each n-tuple of policies ηk ∈ Ωk, k = 1, · · · ,n, let
RR(η1, · · · ,ηn) be the reaction set of the receiver:
RR(η1, · · · ,ηn) := arg min
γk∈Γk,
k=1,··· ,n
JR(η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1, · · · ,γn). (6)
Correspondingly, for each n-tuple of policies γk ∈ Γk, k =
1, · · · ,n, the reaction set of the sender is given by
RT (γ1, · · · ,γn) := arg min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,··· ,n
JT (η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1, · · · ,γn).
This implies that the equilibrium achieving policy pairs
(η∗,γ∗) satisfy
η∗ ∈ RT (γ∗) and γ∗ ∈ RR(η∗). (7)
However, existence of a Nash equilibrium point is not
guaranteed a priori, as we further discuss below.
We note that reference [1] has studied single-stage, i.e.,
n= 1, strategic information transmission of scalar source and
bias information under Nash equilibrium. In that problem,
the policy space of the transmitter is the set of all Lebesgue
measurable functions of the state and the bias information.
In that general single-stage context, it was shown that all
the equilibrium achieving policies of the transmitter are
quantization based, i.e., non-injective, mappings of the state
and the bias information. In particular, linear policies for the
transmitter do not achieve a Nash equilibrium.
Different from [1], however, here the receiver has no
direct access to the bias information θk, whereas in [1],
the bias was a common knowledge of both agents. In our
framework, the following theorem addresses the existence
of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1. In both single and multi-stage problems with the
objectives (4) and (5), a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium (7)
does not exist.
3‖ · ‖ denotes the Euclidean (L2) norm of (·).
Proof. We point out that the optimization problem (5)
faced by the receiver is a standard recursive estimation prob-
lem in which minimizing policies γk, k= 1, · · · ,n, are unique
for each ηk. In particular, for a given k-tuple η1, · · · ,ηk, the
optimum policy γ∗k is given by
γ∗k (y1, · · · ,yk;η1, · · · ,ηk)
= E{xk|y1 = η1(x1,θ1,z1), · · · ,yk = ηk(xk1,θ k1 ,zk1)}. (8)
Since (xk1,θ
k
1 ,z
k
1) are jointly Gaussian for each ηk ∈Ωk and
have zero-mean, γ∗k is going to be linear in (y1, · · · ,yk).
Hence, for Nash equilibrium, (8) yields that γ∗k , k= 1, · · · ,n,
are going to be unique and linear in the actions of sender,
i.e., (y1, · · · ,yk). Assume now that the policy pair (η∗,γ∗)
achieves a Nash equilibrium. Then, by (8), we can write
γ∗k (y1, · · · ,yk;η1, · · · ,ηk) =
k
∑
j=1
κk, j(η∗) y j (9)
and for given κ∗k, j = κk, j(η
∗), k = 1, · · · ,n, and j = 1, · · · ,k,
the sender faces the following optimization problem
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1··· ,n
JT
(
η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1 = κ∗1,1y1, · · · ,γn =
n
∑
j=1
κ∗n, jy j
)
,
= min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1··· ,n
n
∑
k=1
E
{(
xk+θk−
k
∑
j=1
κ∗k, jy
∗
j
)2}
, (10)
where
y j =
j
∑
i=1
b j,ixi+ c j,iθi+d j,izi (11)
and we use bk, j,ck, j,dk, j ∈ R instead of Bk, j,Ck, j,Dk, j from
(2) since we consider the scalar case. This quadratic objective
function is continuous in parameters and bounded from
below, i.e., non-negative.
Note that by (8), (9) and (11), we have κ∗kk 6= 0 if bk,k 6= 0.
Then, bk,k = ck,k = (κ∗k,k)
−1,
bk, j =− 1κ∗k,k
k−1
∑
i=1
κ∗k,ibi, j, ck, j =−
1
κ∗k,k
k−1
∑
i=1
κ∗k,ici, j,
and dk,k = dk, j = 0 for k = 1, · · · ,n and j = 1, · · · ,k− 1
achieve the global minimum in (27), which is zero. Let
η˜∗ = (η˜∗1 , · · · , η˜∗n ) be the corresponding n-tuple of optimum
policies. By (9) and (11), η˜∗ implies that γ∗1 is given by
γ∗1 (y1; η˜
∗
1 ) = κ
∗
1,1
(
1
κ∗1,1
x1+
1
κ∗1,1
θ1
)
, (12)
which yields γ∗1 (y1; η˜
∗
1 ) = x1+θ1. However, by (3) and (5),
for given η˜∗, γ1 minimizes the following sub-problem:
min
γ1∈Γ1
E

(
x1− γ1
(
1
κ∗1,1
x1+
1
κ∗1,1
θ1
))2
and the corresponding optimum policy is given by
γ∗1
(
1
κ∗1,1
x1+
1
κ∗1,1
θ1; η˜∗1
)
=
σ2x
σ2x +σ2θ
(x1+θ1), (13)
which is not equal to (12) for any statistics of the parameters.
In particular, the receiver always has an incentive to change
his/her policy (12) to (13). This yields a contradiction for
both single and multi stage Nash equilibria (7), therefore
there are no policy pairs that lead to a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. 
Since our main interest in this paper is the Stackelberg
equilibrium (discussed next), we do not pursue existence
of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or pure-strategy equi-
librium in nonlinear policies.
IV. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
We now consider that there is a hierarchy between the
agents in the announcement of the policies such that the
sender leads the game by announcing his/her policies before-
hand and sticks to that announced policy. This corresponds
to a Stackelberg equilibrium problem [20] such that the
leader, i.e., the sender, chooses his policy based on the
corresponding best response of the follower, i.e., the receiver.
In our problem, by (6) and (8), for each ηk ∈Ωk, the reaction
set of the receiver is a singleton since the corresponding best
response policies of the receiver are unique and given by
(8). To this end, the sender seeks optimal policies η∗ which
minimize JT (η1, · · · ,ηn;γ1, · · · ,γn) over ηk ∈ Ωk and γk ∈
RR(η1, · · · ,ηn) for k= 1, · · · ,n. In particular, the optimization
problem faced by the sender is given by
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=1,··· ,n
JT (η1, ...,ηn;γ∗1 (y1;η1), ...,γ
∗
n (y1, ...,yn;η1, ...,ηn))
(14)
and for k = 1, · · · ,n, γ∗k is given by (8).
Proposition 1. The Stackelberg equilibrium problem (14)
attains a global minimum.
Proof. The optimization objective in (14) is continuous in
the design parameters, i.e., bk, j,ck, j,dk, j ∈ R, j = 1, · · · ,k,
that define ηk in (2), and bounded from below since the
quadratic measure (4) is non-negative. Then, consider that
the design parameters bk, j,ck, j,dk, j ∈ R¯, k = 1, · · · ,n, and
j = 1, · · · ,k, where R¯= R∪{−∞,+∞} is the extended real
line. For this problem, since the design parameters can take
values over the compact set R¯ and the objective function is
continuous in the design parameters, (14) attains a global
minimum by the extreme value theorem.
Next, we show that in that extended problem for all
design parameters, i.e., bk, j,ck, j,dk, j ∈ R¯, there are finite
design parameters b˜k, j, c˜k, j, d˜k, j ∈R achieving the same cost.
Consider the action of receiver at stage k ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, i.e.,
E{xk|y1, · · · ,y j, · · · ,yk}, where y j is given by (11) for each
j= 1, · · · ,k. If more than one of the design parameters from
the set {b j,1, ...,b j, j,c j,1, ...,c j, j,d j,1, ...,d j, j}, or just one of
c j,i or d j,i, where i ∈ {1, · · · , j}, is not finite, then the action
can also be written as
E{xk|y1, ...,y j, ...,yk}= E{xk|y1, ...,y j−1,y j+1, ...,yk},
which can also be obtained by setting b j,i = c j,i = d j,i = 0,
i = 1, · · · , j. If just one of b j,i, i ∈ {1, · · · , j}, is not finite,
say b j,i, then
E{xk|y1, ...,y j, ...,yk}= E{xk|y1, ...,y j−1,xi,y j+1, ...,yk},
which can also be obtained by setting b j,i = 1 and the other
design parameters to zero, i.e., b j,t = 0 ∀t ∈ {1, · · · , j}\{i}
and c j,i = d j,i = 0 for i= 1, · · · , j. Since we choose arbitrary
k ∈ {1, · · · ,n} and j ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, for the optimum design
parameters, i.e., b∗k, j,c
∗
k, j,d
∗
k, j ∈ R¯, there are finite design
parameters b˜∗k, j, c˜
∗
k, j, d˜
∗
k, j ∈R achieving the same cost. Hence,
for the design parameters chosen from the real line, the
objective function (14) attains the global minimum. 
Let us first recall the result in the static setting. By (2)
and (8), the single-stage, i.e., n= 1, Stackelberg equilibrium
problem is given by
min
b1,1,c1,1,d1,1∈R
E{(x1+θ1−E{x1|b1,1x1+ c1,1θ1+d1,1z1})2}.
(15)
Let x1 and θ1 be correlated, i.e., ρ := E{x1θ1} 6= 0. Then,
the following lemma presents the Stackelberg solution of the
single-state problem.
Lemma 1. [16] For the single-stage Stackelberg equilibrium
problem (15), essentially unique optimal design parameters
of sender, (b∗1,1,c
∗
1,1,d
∗
1,1), are
b∗1,1 = 1, c
∗
1,1 =
−σ2x +σx
√
σ2x +4(σ2θ +ρ)
2(σ2θ +ρ)
, d∗1,1 = 0. (16)
Next, let us consider the two-stage equilibrium, which can
also be written as
min
b1,1,c1,1,d1,1,
b2,1,c2,1,d2,1,
b2,2,c2,2,d2,2∈R
E{(x1+θ1−E{x1|b1,1x1+ c1,1θ1+d1,1z1})2}
+E
{(
x2+θ2−E
{
x2|b1,1x1+ c1,1θ1+d1,1z1,
2
∑
j=1
b2, jx j+ c2, jθ j+d2, jz j
})2}
. (17)
The optimization problem (17) has a finite number of min-
imization arguments, i.e., 9 arguments for the 2-stage equi-
librium problem, and can be solved by standard optimiza-
tion approaches. However, this is computationally involved;
hence for tractability reasons, here we employ a different
approach.
The following lemma addresses whether the policies of
sender can be memoryless or not in the multi-stage Stackel-
berg equilibrium problem (14), and we say that a policy ηk,
k ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, is memoryless if ηk depends solely on xk, θk,
and zk.
Lemma 2. In the multi-stage Stackelberg equilibrium (14),
i.e., n > 1, the optimal linear policies of sender can be
constructed as memoryless.
Proof. By (8), the Stackelberg equilibrium problem (14)
can also be written in terms of the design parameters as
min
b j,i,c j,i,d j,i∈R
j=1,··· ,n, i=1,··· , j
n
∑
j=1
E{(x j+θ j−E{x j|y1, · · · ,y j})2}, (18)
where y j depends on the design parameters as in (11).
Then, by the Principle of Optimality [21], for the given
optimal actions y∗1, · · · ,y∗n−1, the optimal design parameters
b∗n,i,c∗n,i,d∗n,i, i = 1, · · · ,n, with respect to (18) minimize the
following sub-problem:
min
bn,i,cn,i,dn,i∈R
i=1,··· ,n
E{(xn+θn−E{xn|y∗1, · · · ,y∗n−1,yn})2}. (19)
Let xˆn :=E{xn|y∗1, · · · ,y∗n−1} such that (19) can be written as
min
bn,i,cn,i,dn,i∈R
i=1,··· ,n
E{(xn− xˆn+θn−E{xn− xˆn|yn−E{yn|xˆn}})2}
= min
bn,i,cn,i,dn,i∈R
i=1,··· ,n
E{(x˜n+ θ˜n−E{x˜n|y˜n})2}+E{(E{θn|xˆn})2},
(20)
where we let x˜n := xn− xˆn, θ˜n := θn−E{θn|xˆn}, and y˜n :=
yn−E{yn|xˆn}, and in (20), we use the orthogonality of xn−
xˆn,θ −E{θn|xˆn}, and yn−E{yn|xˆn} with xˆn. Note that y˜n is
given by
y˜n =
n
∑
i=1
bn,ix˜i+ cn,iθ˜i+dn,iz˜i
=bn,nx˜n+ cn,nθ˜n+dn,nz˜n+
n−1
∑
i=1
bn,ix˜i+ cn,iθ˜i+dn,iz˜i︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ωn
, (21)
where x˜i = xi−E{xi|xˆn}, θ˜i = θi−E{θi|xˆn}, and z˜i = zi−
E{zi|xˆn} for i = 1, · · · ,n− 1, and z˜n = zn −E{zi|xˆn} = zn.
Then, by adding and subtracting multiples of x˜n and θ˜n, we
obtain
y˜n=(bn,n+λx)x˜n+(cn,n+λθ )θ˜n+dn,nzn+ωn−λxx˜n−λθ θ˜n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:ω˜n
.
Our aim is to choose λx,λθ ∈ R such that ω˜n is pairwise
independent of both x˜n and θ˜n, and ω˜n is independent of
zn by definition. Since all parameters are jointly Gaussian,
uncorrelatedness, i.e., E{x˜nω˜n}=E{θ˜nω˜n}= 0, implies pair-
wise independence. This leads to[
E{x˜2n} E{x˜nθ˜n}
E{x˜nθ˜n} E{θ˜ 2n }
][
λx
λθ
]
=
[
E{ωnx˜n}
E{ωnθ˜n}
]
, (22)
where the matrix on the left hand side of (22) is invertible
unless there exists a τ > 0 such that the random variables
x˜n and θ˜n satisfy x˜n = τθ˜n, which is not possible due to the
independent noises wn and vn. Hence, there exist λx,λθ ∈R
such that ω˜n ⊥ x˜n, ω˜n ⊥ θ˜n, and ω˜n ⊥ zn, and we obtain4
y˜n = (bn+λx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b˜n
x˜n+(cn+λθ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=c˜n
θ˜n+dnzn+ ω˜n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d˜n,nνn
, (23)
where b˜n, c˜n, d˜n ∈ R and νn is a standard normal random
variable that is independent of the other parameters. Since
the last term of the objective function in (20) is independent
4For notational simplicity, we let b j = b j, j , c j = c j, j , and d j = d j, j .
of the minimization arguments, by (23) we can write the
minimization problem (20) as
min
bn,cn,dn∈R
E{(x˜n+ θ˜n−E{x˜n|bnx˜n+ cnθ˜n+dnνn})2}. (24)
This shows that the last stage action of the sender can be
chosen as a memoryless policy.
Next, consider the stage-k action of the sender and assume
that the policies ηk+1, · · · ,ηn are memoryless. Then, for the
given optimal actions y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1, the policies ηk, · · · ,ηn or
the corresponding design parameters, minimize the following
sub-problem:
min
b j,i,c j,i,d j,i∈R
j=k,··· ,n, i=1,··· , j
n
∑
j=k
E{(x j+θ j−E{x j|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1, · · · ,y j})2}.
(25)
Since E{x j|E{xi|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1}} = E{x j|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1} and
E{θ j|E{xi|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1}} = E{θ j|E{x j|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1}}, i ≥
j ≥ k, by following identical steps with (19)-(23), we can
write (25) as
min
b j,i,c j,i,d j,i∈R
j=k,··· ,n,
i=1,··· , j
n
∑
j=k
E
{(
x¯ j+ θ¯ j−E
{
x¯ j|y¯k, · · · , y¯ j
})2}
, (26)
where for j = k, · · · ,n, x¯ j := x j−E{x j|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1}, θ¯ j :=
θ j−E{θ j|E{x j|y∗1, · · · ,y∗k−1}}, y¯ j := b j x¯ j+ c jθ¯ j+d jν j, and
ν j is a standard normal random variable that is independent
of the other parameters. Hence, (26) implies that the optimal
policy η∗k ∈Ωk can be chosen as memoryless. By induction,
we conclude that in the multi-stage Stackelberg equilibrium,
all the policies of sender can be chosen as memoryless. 
Remark 1. We point out that (24) and Lemma 1 yield that
in the multi-stage Stackelberg equilibrium (14), the optimal
policy of the sender at the last stage, i.e., η∗n ∈Ωn, is a pure
strategy such that the policy includes no noise term, i.e.,
d∗n,n = 0. Furthermore, the corresponding essentially unique
design parameters are given by b∗n,n = 1 and 0 < c∗n,n < 1.
The following theorem addresses whether all the optimal
policies of the sender are pure strategies or not.
Theorem 2. The multistage problem, n > 1, admits pure
strategy Stackelberg equilibrium in the set of linear strategies
if, and only if, ax = aθ .
Proof. Lemma 2 shows that the optimal linear policies
of the sender can be constructed as memoryless. Hence, we
consider memoryless policies and we specifically focus on
the policy at stage-(n− 1). Note that by the Principle of
Optimality for given η∗1 , · · · ,η∗n−2, the last two policies, i.e.,
ηn−1 and ηn, minimize the following sub-problem:
min
ηk∈Ωk,
k=n−1,n
n
∑
k=n−1
E
{(
xk+θk−E
{
xk|y1 = η∗1 , · · · ,
yn−2 = η∗n−2, · · · ,yk = ηk
})2}
Then, following analogous steps with (19)-(23), we obtain
the following optimization problem:
min
bk,ck,dk∈R,
k=n−1,n
E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1−E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1})2}
+E{(x˜n+ θ˜n−E{x˜n|y˜n−1, y˜n})2}, (27)
where for k ∈ {n − 1, n}, we redefine x˜k := xk −
E{xk|y∗1, · · · ,y∗n−2}, θ˜k := θk − E{θk|E{xk|y∗1, · · · ,y∗n−2}},
y˜k := bkx˜k + ckθ˜k + dkνk, and d∗n = 0 as shown in Remark
1.
Note that the second term in (27) can be written as
E{(x˜n+ θ˜n−E{x˜n|y˜n−1, y˜n})2}
= E{(x˘n+ θ˜n−E{x˘n|y˜n−E{y˜n−1|y˜n}})2}
= E{(x˘n+ θ˘n−E{x˘n|y˜n−1−E{y˜n−1|y˜n}})2}
+E{(E{θ˜n|y˜n})2},
where x˘n := x˜n − E{x˜n|y˜n} and θ˘n := θ˜n − E{θ˜n|y˜n}.
We also define x˘n−1 := x˜n−1 − E{x˜n−1|y˜n} and θ˘n−1 :=
θ˜n−1 −E{θ˜n−1|y˜n} such that y˘n−1 := y˜n−1 −E{y˜n−1|y˜n} =
bn−1x˘n−1+cn−1θ˘n−1+dn−1νn−1. Then, we have the follow-
ing minimization problem:
min
bk,ck,dk∈R,
k=n−1,n
E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1−E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1})2}
+E{(x˘n+ θ˘n−E{x˘n|y˘n−1})2}+E{(E{θ˜n|y˜n})2}. (28)
We point out that by the orthogonality of the es-
timated variable and the estimation error, i.e., (x˜n−1 −
E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1})⊥ E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1}, we obtain
E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1−E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1})2}= E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1)2}
−E{(2θ˜n−1+ x˜n−1)E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1}}
+E{(x˜n−1−E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1})E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1}}
= E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1)2}−E{(2θ˜n−1+ x˜n−1)E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1}}
(29)
and correspondingly
E{(x˘n+ θ˘n−E{x˘n|y˘n−1})2}= E{(x˘n+ θ˘n)2}
−E{(2θ˘n+ x˘n)E{x˘n|y˘n−1}}. (30)
By (29) and (30), the optimization problem (28) can be
written as
min
bk,ck,dk∈R,
k=n−1,n
E{(x˜n−1+ θ˜n−1)2}+E{(x˘n+ θ˘n)2}
−E{(2θ˜n−1+ x˜n−1)E{x˜n−1|y˜n−1}}
−E{(2θ˘n+ x˘n)E{x˘n|y˘n−1}}+E{(E{θ˜n|y˜n})2}. (31)
Eventually, after some algebra for (31), we have the opti-
mization problem in (32), where for k ∈ {n−1,n}, we define
ϕk = E{x˜ky˜k}= bkE{x˜2k}+ ckE{x˜kθ˜k}
φk = E{θ˜ky˜k}= bkE{θ˜kx˜k}+ ckE{θ˜ 2k },
(33)
which are independent of dk, and
∆ :=
axφnϕn−1−aθφn−1ϕn
bnϕn+ cnφn
. (34)
max
bk,ck,dk∈R,
k=n−1,n
ϕn−1(2φn−1+ϕn−1)
bn−1ϕn−1+ cn−1φn−1+d2n−1
+
ϕn(2φn+ϕn)
bnϕn+ cnφn
+
cn(cn−2bn)∆2
bn−1ϕn−1+ cn−1φn−1− (axbnϕn−1+aθ cnφn−1)
2
bnϕn+cnφn +d
2
n−1
(32)
Proposition 1 says that (32) attains globally optimal solu-
tions, and let b∗k ,c
∗
k , and d
∗
k for k ∈ {n−1,n} be the globally
optimal solutions of (32). Note that d2n−1 ≥ 0 stands only in
the first and the last terms in (32), and the quadratic terms,
bn−1ϕn−1+ cn−1φn−1− (axbnϕn−1+aθ cnφn−1)
2
bnϕn+ cnφn
= E{(bn−1x˘n−1+ cn−1θ˘n−1)2}, (35)
bn−1ϕn−1+ cn−1φn−1 = E{(bn−1x˜n−1+ cn−1θ˜n−1)2}, (36)
are non-negative. Assume that d∗n−1 = 0. Due to the quadratic
terms (35) and (36), as seen in (32), d∗n−1 = 0 implies that the
first and the last term in (32) are non-negative. However, by
(24), Lemma 1 and Remark 1, the essentially unique optimal
design parameters in the last stage action are given by b∗n= 1,
0< c∗n < 1, and d∗n = 0, which yields that the last term in (32)
is non-positive and it is zero if ∆ = 0. Hence, if d∗n−1 = 0,
the other optimal design parameters satisfy ∆= 0. Then, for
given ∆= 0 and d∗n−1 = 0, (32) can be written as
max
bk,ck∈R,k∈{n−1,n}
n
∑
k=n−1
ϕk(2ϕk+φk)
bkϕk+ ckφk
,
where the objective function is separable with respect to
optimization arguments such that
max
bk,ck∈R
ϕk(2ϕk+φk)
bkϕk+ ckφk
, (37)
for k ∈ {n−1,n}. The optimal action of the sender at stage-
(n−1) has no impact on the optimal action at stage-n even
for the finite horizon objective. Given that the objective
function is separable for the last (m−1)-stages, in a similar
way, it can be shown that the action at stage-m has no impact
on the future stages. Hence, by induction, we conclude that
the objective function (14) is separable with respect to the
optimization arguments as in (37) for k ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, and
d∗k = 0 for all k ∈ {1, · · · ,n}. However, this would imply that
the first two stages can also be separated, which yields that
axb2c1 = aθb1c2 (38)
by (33) and (34). Correspondingly, because of the separabil-
ity of the objective function, (14) can be separated as
min
ηk∈Ωk
E{(xk+θk−E{xk|yk})2}
for k= 1, · · · ,n, which leads to η∗1 =η∗2 = · · ·=η∗n due to the
stationarity of the state xk and the bias θk. Then, (38) yields
that ax = aθ , which is a contradiction since we consider any
ax,aθ ∈ (−1,1) a priori. Hence, d∗n−1 = 0 if and only if ax =
aθ , and if ax = aθ , then d∗k = 0 for all k = 1, · · · ,n. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the structure of linear
equilibrium strategies for dynamic Gaussian signaling games.
Our main result is that unless the state and bias processes
evolve in an identical fashion, a pure (linear) strategy does
not achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium for a dynamic game,
while the static version of the game admits pure (linear)
strategies as the essentially unique solution. This difference
in the optimal strategies is due to the trade-off between costs
at different stages of the game; such trade-offs were also
encountered in several other asymmetric information games.
We have limited the space of strategies to linear; the analysis
in unrestricted policy spaces is left as part of future work.
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